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Abstract—This article presents an asynchronous FPGA
architecture for implementing cryptographic algorithms
secured against physical cryptanalysis. We discuss the
suitability of asynchronous reconfigurable architectures
for such applications before proceeding to model the
side channel and defining our objectives. The logic block
architecture is presented in detail. We discuss several
solutions for the interconnect architecture, and how these
solutions can be ported to other flavours of interconnect
(i.e. single driver). Next We discuss in detail a high speed
asynchronous configuration chain architecture used to
configure our asynchronous FPGA with simulation results,
and we present a 3 × 3 prototype FPGA fabricated in
65 nm CMOS. Lastly we present experiments to test
the high speed asynchronous configuration chain and
evaluate how far our objectives have been achieved with
proposed solutions, and we conclude with emphasis on
complementary FPGA CAD algorithms, and the effect of
CMOS variation on Side-Channel Vulnerability.
Key-words: FPGA Structure, Asynchronous Logic,
Secure Applications, Side-Channel Attacks, Native
Countermeasures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is a mean to defend against potential
attackers, notably to protect confidentiality, integrity or
secure authentication, whereas cryptanalysis is about the
challenge to retrieve hidden information. There are no
known mathematical cryptanalysis methods which can
decrypt standard cryptographic algorithms like AES in a
reasonable amount of time and space, assuming that the
cryptanalyst has access to both plain-text and encrypted
messages. However all such algorithms are implemented
with some physical process, that leak information. An
access to this information makes the job of the crypt-
analyst much easier. These kinds of information leakage
from physical processes are commonly known as side-
channel leakage.
For the purpose of this article, we divide cryptanalysis
broadly in two categories: mathematical and physical.
In this article, we assume that concerned cryptographic
algorithms are secure at the mathematical level, and we
specifically address the issue of physical cryptanalysis
and countermeasures. Physical cryptanalysis can again
be of two types, namely active and passive. Injecting
faults to perturb the physical implementation is an exam-
ple of active attacks, whereas attacks based on measuring
power consumption / electromagnetic (EM) radiation are
examples of passive attacks, commonly known as Side-
Channel Attacks (SCAs).
Physical cryptanalysis has been demonstrated to be
effective against various standard algorithms, and on
various platforms in recent times. Researchers have
shown that side-channel attacks can be mounted on stan-
dard cryptographic algorithms like DES [19], AES [30],
RSA [19]. References [54], [43] provide with the details
of such attacks on FPGA implementations whereas var-
ious attacks [51] has been reported on ASIC implemen-
tation. A widely known SCA is DPA (Differential Power
Analysis) [32], which exists in various forms [12] and
concerns the information leaked through supply current
peaks. Attacks which exploit the Electromagnetic Emis-
sions (EMA) [2] from the hardware, constitute another
major branch of Side-Channel Attacks. The attacks on
RSA, which use the difference in execution time, as their
major source of information have also been reported,
and these are commonly known as Timing Attacks [19].
The reader could as well find a comprehensive report of
active attack details in [5].
Now then, who’s at risk? A very evident answer
should be banking applications. Credit cards use al-
gorithms similar to RSA for authentication, and 2-key
Triple DES for the challenge [52]. Wholesale frauds on
systems which rely on smart cards for their security (e.g.
Pay-TV) could well be a target of such attacks. Mounting
a side-channel attack calls for considerable expertise
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2and high-resolution equipments. So such techniques are
prone to be used when there is a considerable gain. A
major threat could be intellectual property protection
because of this reason. The attacker can easily gain
access to piracy protection devices embedded in com-
mercial systems, and steal the IPs. All the more reason
to incorporate side channel resistance into these systems.
In the rest of article we will move in a top-down
fashion. Section II presents the asynchronous circuits
and protocols, and the salient points of this technology.
Section III provides a brief overview and classification
of side-channel attacks, the assumed models and a
classification of countermeasures. In Section IV we list
the features of asynchronous reconfigurable circuits that
make them especially suitable for security applications.
Once the reader gains an understanding of where this
article is situated among these vast interacting domains,
we provide a model for the side channel in section V
and set our objectives. We present the logic block
architecture of our asynchronous FPGA in section VI.
Section VII addresses the issue of interconnect design,
which makes up the most of the area in an FPGA and
section VIII presents the method to port these solutions
to the new single driver architecture. In Section X we
present a prototype asynchronous FPGA and section XI
presents the evaluation of the proposed solutions based
on experiments. Section XII presents the conclusions
from this research effort.
II. ASYNCHRONOUS CIRCUITS
In this section we discuss the key ideas of asyn-
chronous logic. The author welcomes the reader to take
a look at the following publications for more detailed
discussions [24], [13], [44]. Figure 1(b) shows the basic
asynchronous handshake protocol. The sender puts valid
data on the data line and sends a request on the REQ line
to show the validity of data. Once the receiver has read
the data, it asserts the ACK line so that sender can put
some new data. This basic protocol is formally defined
as production rules or Seitz’s weak conditions [39].
However this basic scheme is not hazard free. For
example, if the line has more delay than the REQ line,
it is possible that the receiver gets the request before
the DATA is valid. To avoid such hazards the DATA
and REQ are often encoded into a single channel. Most
common encodings are 1-out-of-n encodings similar to
one hot codes for finite state machines. Figure 1(c)
depicts the 1-out-of-2 encoding. Table I describes the
encoding scheme. Apart from encodings, the signalling
protocol can also be of various flavours. The popular
four phase protocol uses one phase for computation,
and one phase to precharge all signals to zero state.
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(a) Synchronous
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Figure 1. Asynchronous protocols: Figure 1(a) shows the syn-
chronous methodology where data is valid only at the positive
edge of the clock signal. Figure 1(b) shows the handshaking in
asynchronous protocol, the arrows show the causality of the request
and acknowledgement events.
Table I
1-OUT-OF-2, 4-PHASE PROTOCOL.
Value DATA0 DATA1
’0’ ’1’ ’0’
’1’ ’0’ ’1’
Precharge ’0’ ’0’
Forbidden ’1’ ’1’
At the opposite, 2-phase protocols (NRZ) does not use
precharge. Details about 2-phase protocols can be found
in [21], [29].
Since in a asynchronous signalling scheme each event
has significance (as opposed to synchronous logic where
a glitch can occur without disturbing the functionality),
the asynchronous protocols are completely glitch free.
Glitches are results of unbalanced input path arrival
times (unbalanced joins). In asynchronous circuits, this
hazard is taken care of with C-Elements [40] at the
gate level, however at the transistor level, there is an
additional constraint of forks balanced in delays. This
constraint is commonly known as “isochronous fork”
3constraint [24], and such asynchronous circuits are called
Quasi-Delay Insensitive (QDI) asynchronous circuits.
In this article we assume QDI asynchronous circuits
implicitly whenever we discuss asynchronous protocols.
Various asynchronous FPGA architectures proposed
in literature often use the properties of asynchronous
logic for high performance (high speed, low power,
robustness). Typical architectures divide into several
categories: fine grain [48], [49], [47], coarse grain [23],
[33], [17] and GALS [15]. Indeed, with asynchronous
logic glitch-free operation and absence of clock net-
work can substantially reduce power consumption, and
slack elasticity [48] of asynchronous can augment the
throughput. The architecture presented in this article has
its focus on resistance against physical cryptanalysis,
while enjoying the above-mentioned benefits of being
asynchronous.
In the most recently proposed asynchronous FPGA ar-
chitecture [48], [49], [47] the logic block is designed as-
suming the 1-out-2 4-phase protocol, and uses pipelines
in the routing switches to increase throughput. Routing
segments are a 3-wire bundle (DATA0, DATA1, ACK).
Our logic block architecture is much more fine grain to
accommodate a plethora of encoding schemes and styles
and the routing architecture is single wires, on which
dual-rails are routed together. This is done, keeping in
mind the prototyping role of an FPGA, and flexibility
required for dynamic countermeasures to operate. Since
we don’t know of any future-proof solution to resist
physical cryptanalysis, this architecture will provide the
designer a soft fine grain fabric on which he/she can
implement a mix of dynamic and static countermeasures
pertinent to the application. In section XI, we will discuss
the additional cost to be paid for this added flexibility.
III. SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS
Side-Channel Attacks are very similar to Spec-
troscopy(NMR) used over the years. While in spec-
troscopy, patterns in the light spectrum are used to
detect the presence of atoms and its environments in
an unknown substance, in a Side- Channel Attack the
cryptanalyst looks for patterns in the power consumption
or EM emission to detect the unknown key value.
We classify Side-Channel Attacks in two ways. They
are either based on the acquisition method:
• Supply current measurement (DPA)
• EM emission measurement (EMA)
• Timing difference measurement (Timing Attack)
or based on processing methods:
• Correlation based. (The measured traces are corre-
lated with the predicted trace from assumed model)
• Template. (The model itself is created from experi-
mental measurements on one sample, which is then
used to predict the traces for clone circuits [12])
We will give a very basic example of how a side-channel
attack is carried out. A broad overview can be found
in [51]. Referring to Fig. 1(a) we can see that in an
unprotected synchronous logic, each change of state of
a signal can be distinguished by a current spike, and no
change of state by an absence of current spike in the
power supply line. Given this basic behaviour of CMOS
circuits a side-channel cryptanalyst could proceed in the
following fashion:
• He finds a signal which is a function of say N bits
of the key, and the input message of M bits.
• He performs the encryption 2M for each different
message value and acquires the power trace of each
of them.
• He makes 2N key guesses and for each key guess
he make current spike predictions for 2M traces.
• Among these 2N current spike predictions for 2M
encryptions, the one which correlates best with the
measured power trace, is the correct key guess.
Indeed, the asymptotic prediction matches the real
observation only for the correct key guess.
The activity of other nodes are not correlated since
they are not a function of the targeted message and
key bits. These activities of other nodes appear as noise
after the processing of acquired traces. The resistance to
physical cryptanalysis, relies on maximizing this signal
to noise ratio (SNR) either by static or dynamic coun-
termeasures. Figure 2(a) shows the raw power traces
after acquisition on an ASIC implementation of DES,
and figure 2(b) shows the appearance of predicted peak
when correlated with the right key guess.
A. Countermeasures
The reported countermeasures to side-channel attacks
can be classified as dynamic countermeasures (incorpo-
rated at run-time) and static counter measures (incorpo-
rated at design time).
1) Dynamic Countermeasures: The principle of dy-
namic countermeasures is to decorrelate computing from
the power supply current, by randomising transitions,
commonly known as “masking”. This can be by either
precharging signals with random values, or introducing
random delays in computing paths [31], [3], [42]. These
masking techniques are introduced at the algorithmic
level. Details about implementing and attacking such
countermeasures can be found in [34], [38].
4(a) Raw power traces after acquisition.
(b) After Processing.
Figure 2. Correlation peaks appear for the right guess: Figure 2(a)
shows the power consumption traces of a complete DES encryption
process. This raw power trace is analysed for 64 possible sub-key
guess. Figure 2(b) is the resulting waveform for the right guess for
two power predictions.
2) Static Countermeasures: Static countermeasures
rely on producing a constant power consumption profile
independent of the data being computed. This is com-
monly done with differential signalling with a precharge
to ‘0’, where power consumption profile of one rail hides
that of the other. Examples of such countermeasures are
WDDL [50], Backend Duplication [16], or STTL [37].
1-out-of-n asynchronous signalling also falls in this
category. To mitigate the remaining unbalance of the
various rails, an unpredictable random switching of them
can be enforced. MDPL [36] is a typical example of such
a strategy.
IV. SUITABILITY OF ASYNCHRONOUS FPGA FOR
PHYSICAL CRYPTANALYSIS RESISTANCE
In this section we point out to the reader the moti-
vations behind the architecture we are going to discuss.
The suitability of asynchronous circuits for cryptanalysis
resistance has already been investigated by [27].
• Resistance to Fault Attacks. Random introduction
of faults stalls the asynchronous circuit [28], [26].
So the cryptanalyst does not receive the encrypted
messages with fault syndromes. To do so, faults
have to be injected very carefully, at a precise time
and location, which makes the attack considerably
difficult.
• Absence of a Time Reference. The absence of
a reference signal (i.e. CLK) in an asynchronous
circuit, prevents the attacker to assume a precise
model for transitions he is trying to predict, whereas
in a synchronous circuit the targeted transitions
must occur within the clock cycle. Moreover, the
power consumption of the clock signal is clearly
visible in the power trace, and provides an overall
idea of the circuit operation.
• Power Constant Signalling. As shown in fig-
ure 1(a) the supply current spikes, clearly denote
the change of state of the signal, or the absence
of a peak denotes that no changes occurred in the
signal value. On the contrary, for asynchronous 1-
out-of-2 signalling (see Fig. 1(c)) each valid signal
value is accompanied by one spike in the supply
current. Note that both signals are precharged to a
neutral value (“00”) in between the valid data. This
power constant signalling falls well into the cate-
gory of static countermeasures previously discussed
in section III-A2.
• Absence of Glitches. In synchronous implemen-
tations, glitches can occur without disturbing the
functionality. Glitches magnify the current spikes
shown in figure 1(a). Reference [14] discusses
the effect of glitches on Side-Channel Attacks.
As discussed in section II asynchronous circuits
can not work in the presence of glitches and are
consequently less vulnerable.
• Reconfigurability. The motivation to opt for a
reconfigurable architecture, rather than a hardwired
circuit is firstly to achieve a mix between the dy-
namic and static countermeasures, (see section III-A
and [10], [25]) depending on the application. Sec-
ondly, as a prototyping platform for evaluating vari-
ous asynchronous styles and/or masking techniques.
V. MODELLING THE SIDE CHANNEL
A. Dynamic Power Consumption Model
At first order, static leakage power in CMOS does
not contain any information about the computation being
performed and is a constant hence we do not take it into
account for SCA. Power consumption is proportional
to the current charged and discharged from the power
supply.
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Figure 3. Dynamic power consumption model: Figure 3(a) shows
the power model of a CMOS logic circuit as the sum of +ve/-ve
step responses of the individual gates. Figure 3(b) shows the power
consumption model of buffered nets considered as gates with only
one input. Unbuffered nets are included in the capacitance seen by
the gate driving that net.
We model dynamic power consumption in CMOS in
two levels.
• First the internal power consumption of the gate,
which is due to charging and discharging of internal
nets and transistor short-circuit currents inside the
gate.
• Secondly the power consumption of the net driven
by the gate which also includes the input capaci-
tances of the driven gates.
Side-Channel Information is in the dynamic current
profile of the circuit, thus we need a detailed model for
this consumption. For this reason, each gate and each
net is associated with its step current response (i.e. the
contribution of the component to the current Imeasured
(see fig. 3(a))).
a) Gate Level: We consider gates with N inputs.
Thus the gate is characterized by its step current response
as the input vector undergoes a transition ij → ik while
the gate output is open.
Sij→ik(τ) = Imeasured(τ) (1)
and the gate is characterized by the set of all step
responses corresponding to each transition.
⋃
0<i<2N−1
0<j<2N−1
Sij→ik(τ)
R2
C3
S
C2
R5R3
i
C5
R1
C1
C4
R4
Figure 4. Delay model for the FPGA interconnect.
b) Net Level: Each net has only one input, hence
it is characterized by the set which contains its positive
and negative step response.[
S0→1(τ), S1→0(τ)
]
while the input to the net is a positive or negative step.
We consider both positive and negative step response
because the charging and discharging network for the net
could be different in the actual layout.
We model a buffered net as depicted in figure 3(b). It is
a delayed sum of the step responses of each segment, and
the step responses for active gates (buffers). This point
to point delay is calculated using widely used Elmore
Delay model as described in the next section.
1) Delay Model: To calculate the point to point delay
in the above model we use the widely used Elmore delay
model [41]. The Elmore delay is given by:
τi =
N∑
k=1
CkRik ,
where N is the number of capacitances in the equivalent
network and Rik is given by
Rik =
∑
Rj ⇒ (Rj ∈ [path (S → i) ∩ path (S → k)])
B. Secure Place-Route Objectives
1) Indiscernability in power consumption:
a) Gate Level: In section V-A we have modelled
the power consumption profile of a gate (a LUT in
this case) as a set of step current response for each
transition. Asynchronous logic gates are mapped into two
symmetric LUTs as shown in figure 7. According to the
1-out-of-2 4-phase protocol, only one of these two gates
will evaluate for each evaluate and precharge cycle. To
guarantee that the current consumption profile of these
two gates are similar, we try to assure that:
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Figure 5. Imbalance in capacitance and delay leakage information.
• for a LUT each path from input to the output is
indiscernible from each other.
• each path from the configuration memory point to
the output is also indiscernible from each other.
If these conditions are met, it is not possible to predict
which gate has evaluated, even if the corresponding dual-
rails does not use the same inputs of the corresponding
LUTs.
b) Net Level: Figure 5 shows the effect of im-
balance in capacitance and delay in dual-rails, on side
channel leakage. Even these small differences could be
exploited for cryptanalysis [51]. In section V-A we have
modelled each interconnect by its positive and negative
step current response. Ideally:
• the +ve and -ve step current response for each dual-
rail should be identical.
• for a buffered net, the buffers used should be
identical, and each segment between buffers should
also have identical step current response.
As a measure of indiscernability, we use the cross-
correlation of the step responses of each net. The higher
the cross-correlation, the more difficult it is to predict
which net has undergone transitions.
However to simplify the design procedure we make
the following assumptions: the same length of wire
of same width, charging the same capacitances, has a
similar step current response, that is consumes the same
current and causes the same delay irrespective of any
bends.
In this respect we also define equitemporal lines for
n-wire signals. An equitemporal line ( ) is the set
of points attainable simultaneously by signals originating
from synchronized sources (i.e. wave fronts.)
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Figure 6. PLB overview.
2) Indiscernability in EM emission: The radiation
pattern measured at any point in space should be the
same for each wire of a n-wire bus. For example, given
a set of parallel wires (not twisted), we can choose a
point closer to one of the wires and further from others.
At that very point in space, radiation patterns emitted
from different wires will be distinguishable.
At the gate level, the dual gates should be placed as
close as possible, and at the net level we propose to route
the dual-rail signals as a twisted pair (abridged “T-Pair”)
to deter EMA.
VI. LOGIC BLOCK ARCHITECTURE
Fig. 6(a) depicts the structure of the PLB (Pro-
grammable Logic Block) able to handle the main QDI
asynchronous styles. Black triangles at the left of LUTs
are multiplexers controlled by programming points. The
P output block is described more precisely by Fig. 6(b)
and Fig. 6(c), in which the black diamonds represent pro-
gramming points. The feedbacks from output to inputs
are used to obtain the memory effect.
Details of the PLB and mappings can be found in [18].
A summary of all the implementable styles in the pro-
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MAPPING CAPACITY OF DIFFERENT PROTOCOLS
A B C
2-phase EDGE 1 n.a. n.a.
2-phase LEDR 0.5 1 n.a.
4-phase 0.5 1 2
L.U.T.
6 7→ 1
L.U.T.
6 7→ 1 O1
Sout
O0
Sin
x
y
Figure 7. Mapping of 1-out-of-2, 2-input Gates onto the PLB
posed PLB is given in table II. The results are given in
number of PLBs. The three configurations considered in
this table are:
A: Dual Rail, 2-input gate with Acknowledge input,
B: Dual Rail, 3-input gate with Acknowledge input,
C: Triple Rail, 2-input gate with Acknowledge input.
For the purpose of this article, we explain mapping
of 1-out-of-2, 2-input Gates onto the PLB here. Other
mappings can be found in [18].
3) 1-out-of-2, 2-Input Gates: Let f(x, y) : F2×F2 7→
F2 a two-variable Boolean function. The inputs are
represented by 4 wires: x0, x1, y0 and y1, to which
a synchronization signal (Acknowledge), Sin, is added
and the output signal O represented by two wires: O0
and O1, together with an acknowledge output Sout. The
individual values of these wires are functions of x and
y, respectively denoted f0(x, y) and f1(x, y).
The equations of the outputs are:
O1=

f1(x, y) if x, y 6= (0, 0) ∧ Sin = 0 ,
0 if x, y = (0, 0) ∧ Sin = 1 ,
O1 otherwise ,
O0=

f0(x, y) if x, y 6= (0, 0) ∧ Sin = 0 ,
0 if x, y = (0, 0) ∧ Sin = 1 ,
O0 otherwise ,
(2)
in which “x, y = (0, 0)” stands for “x = (0, 0) ∧ y =
(0, 0)”.
Eq. (2) shows that O0 and O1 are functions of 6
Boolean variables. Thus the minimal practical size for
the LUTs is 64 bits, which can implement a 6-bit 7→ 1-bit
function. As there are two output bits the minimal size of
the PLB is 2 LUTs. The Sout output can be computed as
DECODER
dec2n−1
CONFIGURATION BITS
ARRAY OF TRANSMISSION GATESdec0
dec0 dec2n−1
I0
In
Figure 8. LUT implementation with a wired AND.
(O1 ∨O0). However, for homogeneity with the 2-phase
protocols, we use (O1 ⊕ O0) instead. Note that, as the
O0 = O1 = 1 state is forbidden, the two functions are
identical on the allowed domain.
A feedback is necessary to obtain the memory ef-
fect. One of the inputs to the LUTs must thus be
programmable between the input to the PLB and the
feedback. As the inputs to the LUTs are the same, with
the exception of the feedback wires, there can be a single
connection box to the routing network. Fig. 7 shows the
minimal structure of the PLB, which allows to implement
2-input gates with synchronization.
The associated wiring is:
O0= LUT6(O0 ,Sin , x1 , x0 , y1 , y0 ) ,
O1= LUT6(Sin , O1 , x1 , x0 , y1 , y0 ) . (3)
In Eq. (3), each wires of x and y is loaded with exactly
the same number of inputs. Note that the Sin signal is
connected twice to the routing network.
4) Balanced LUT Implementation: Figure 8 depicts
the LUT implementation scheme to achieve the objec-
tives set in section V-B. In a classical LUT implemen-
tation with multiplexer trees each input is loaded with
a different capacitance, and also the logic depth from
configuration bits to the outputs varies with the input
activity.
To circumvent these drawbacks, all input capacitances
have been balanced by correctly adjusting the sizes of
decoder’s inverter, and a unique logical depth is imposed
between the configuration bits and the LUT output. More
details about the LUT implementation and simulation
results can be found in [8].
Figure 9 describes the actual PLB layout. The four
6 → 1 LUTs are placed symmetrically, and in between
the input multiplexers are placed which connects the
LUT inputs to the routing resources, and feedbacks. The
block P is placed at the top. All the twelve inputs are
placed at the top, and the seven outputs at the right of
the PLB layout.
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Figure 9. PLB layout in Cadence VIRTUOSO.
VII. ROUTING ARCHITECTURE
We use the traditional mesh routing architecture and
associated nomenclature as explained in [7].
A. Subset Routing Architecture
A subset switchbox [7] can be built by repeating a
basic six-way switch-points along a diagonal, as shown
in figure 10(a). We consider that the diagonal formed
by the six-way switch-points makes up equitemporal
signals (see section V-B) if these signals are outputs
of the same FPGA logic element CLB. Figure 10(b)
shows the routing matrix using a subset switchbox.
Connection boxes from the equitemporal lines to the
CLB inputs/outputs are considered as equitemporals.
They are discussed in section VII-D. In figure 10(b),
the dual pair signals corresponding to connections {A,
A’} and {D, D’} have exactly the same length and the
same electrical characteristics. The same goes for buses
{B, B’} and {C, C’}. Notice that the dual-rail signals
are not necessarily routed in an adjacent way (case of
A and D) and that it is possible to route in the same
fashion multi-wire signals.
B. Twisted Pair Routing Architecture
As a countermeasure against information leakage
through EM radiations, we propose to route every n-
rail signal as a twisted bus. Figure 11(a) shows the
advantages of using a twisted pair compared to parallel
routed wires. If we consider the twisted pair as made
up of several elementary radiating loops, we see that the
radiation from a loop is cancelled by that of adjacent
loops.
In addition to reducing EM compromising radiations
(outputs), the twisted bus gains immunity from its EM
t(2, 0)
t(2, 1)
t(2, 2)
t(2, 3)
t(0, 0)
t(0, 1)
t(0, 2)
t(0, 3)
t(1, 0) t(1, 1) t(1, 2) t(1, 3)
t(3, 1) t(3, 2) t(3, 3)t(3, 0)
(a) Subset switchbox using six-way switch-points.
C’
D’
B
A
C
D
B’
A’
CLB
(b) Equitemporal lines for subset switchbox routing.
Figure 10. Subset switchbox Routing.
vicinity (inputs). Consequently, twisting signals bundles
reduces cross-talk,
In order to route any n-rail signal as a twisted bus
throughout the FPGA, two novel switchboxes are intro-
duced in §VII-B1 and VII-C.
1) Twist-on-Turn Switch Matrix: The basic idea be-
hind this switchbox is that every pair or n-uplets of sig-
nals deflected by the switchbox must come out twisted.
As shown in figure 11(b), every ±pi/2 bend through
this switchbox is a twisted pair. We can express this
switchbox using the notation described in [53] as:
S =
W−1⋃
i=0

[t(0, i), t(2, i)] ,
[t(1, i), t(3, i)] ,
[t(0, i), t(1, i)] ,
[t(1, i), t(2,W − i− 1)] ,
[t(2, i), t(3, i)] ,
[t(3, i), t(0,W − i− 1)] .

9vector out of the page
vector into the page
Legend:
(a)
(b)
(a) Electric & magnetic fields orientation in an un-twisted (a) and in a
twisted (b) pair.
D’A’
CBA D
B’ C’
CLB
(b) Equitemporal lines for the twisted-pair switch-
box.
Figure 11. The twisted-pair switchbox.
where each terminal is represented as t(j, i), where j
denotes each subset corresponding to each side (0 = left,
1 = top, 2 = right, 3 = bottom) and i ∈ [0,W [ denotes the
position of the terminal in that subset. Connection boxes
from the equitemporal lines to the CLB inputs/outputs
are considered as being equitemporal perpendicular to
the routing channel. They are discussed in section VII-D.
In figure 11(b), the dual pair signals corresponding to
connections {A, A’} and {D, D’} have exactly the same
length even if they cross at the switching box. It is
exactly the same for buses {B, B’} and {C, C’}.
When turning, this switch matrix introduces a small
imbalance for the arrival time on the deflecting switch
point. If the switch point is implemented with passive
gates, this balance violation is not observable by an
attacker. The counterpart is that the channels must be
t(0, 1)
t(0, 2)
t(0, 3)
t(2, 0)
t(2, 1)
t(2, 2)
t(2, 3)
t(0, 0)
t(1, 1)t(1, 2)t(1, 3t(1, 0)
t(3, 0)t(3, 1)t(3, 2)t(3, 3)
(a) Twist-on-Turn.
t(0, 1)
t(0, 2)
t(0, 3)
t(2, 0)
t(2, 1)
t(2, 2)
t(2, 3)
t(0, 0)
t(3, 1)t(3, 0)
t(1, 0)t(1, 1)t(1, 2) t(1, 3)
t(3, 2)t(3, 3)
(b) Twist-Always.
Legend
Metal 1
Via
Metal 2
Switch
(c) Twist-always switch matrix layout scheme.
Figure 12. The twisted-pair switchboxes.
buffered, which can safely be done with active gates,
because every wire in a channel is equitemporal.
C. Twist-Always Switch Matrix
The twist-on-turn matrix does not twist buses when
they are routed straight. This matrix can be transformed
into a twist-always matrix by twisting the wire i with
wire W − 1 − i for straight connections, as shown in
figure 12, W being the number of channels.
This matrix allows the use any 1-out-of-n (asyn-
chronous) style, as it is possible to twist a number of
lines greater than two.
This switchbox cannot be implemented with tradi-
tional six-way switch-points, even if the number of
transistors remains the same. A possible implementation
of the twist-always switch box is shown in figure 12(c).
It can be laid out in silicon with two interconnect layers
and by repeating two basic patterns over space. Note that
for straight (e.g. from left to right) connections, the outer
rails are drawn wider than the inner rails to compensate
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for the difference in lengths. Alternatively, every wire
can keep the same nominal width, but inner rails are
forced to zigzag so as to make up for their shorter length.
For bends, every rail traverses an equal distance, hence
this compensation is not required.
These new switchboxes are close to conventional
universal/subset switchboxes in terms of connectivity.
Hence we can expect similar performance in routability
of netlists in the FPGA.
D. Connection Box Implementation
1) Cross-Bar Connection Box: As depicted in fig-
ures 10(b) and 11(b), a signal routed from one equi-
temporal line to another has the same delay. Therefore
the connection box (C-Box) between the W channel
wires and the CLB I ∈ [0,W [ inputs/outputs should
also keep this equitemporality. We propose to use a
crossbar connection box based on balanced binary trees,
built according to the following three rules: (i) from the
channel, W trees have I equal-length branches, (ii) from
the CLB, I trees have W equal-length branches, (iii) the
two trees are superimposed orthogonally and the W × I
branches from each tree type meet via a switch point.
Figure 13(a) illustrates the layout of the balanced
crossbar with W = 4 and I = 4, using only two metal
layers (represented with two different thicknesses.) The
crossbar area is W · dlog2 (I)e × I · dlog2 (W )e square
routing pitches, and can be freely depopulated without
altering its security level.
2) C-Box for Subset & Twisted-Pair Switch Matrix:
The equitemporal lines are either diagonal (for the subset
switch matrix, cf Fig. 10(b)) or horizontal/vertical (for
the twisted switch matrix, cf Fig. 12(c).) The connections
between the channel and the crossbar should compensate
for the wire length delays. A solution for both cases is
illustrated in figure 13.
Example layouts and statistics of the T-pair switchbox,
and the binary-tree connection box can be found in [11].
VIII. SINGLE DRIVER ARCHITECTURE
Single driver segments are shown to give better de-
lay performances and better area-delay product for an
FPGA [20], [22]. These benefits are result of less loading
of interconnect segments, and availability of equal num-
ber of tracks in each direction as in traditional bidir-tri
routing architecture.
Figures 14(a) shows how the subset switchbox layout
scheme 10(a) can be ported to single driver architecture.
Note that the connection box nets are routed as a binary
tree in both X and Y direction. Figure 14(b) shows the
layout scheme for the T-pair switchbox with single driver
I0
I1
I2
I3
W0 W1 W2 W3
(a) Balanced crossbar for the connection
box.
W0 W1 W2 W3
(b) For Subset.
W3W2W1W0
(c) For T-pair.
Figure 13. Balanced crossbar and connections between channel
wires and crossbar.
interconnects. Note that this scheme too uses a basic
switch-point as in 12(c) which is rotated as required.
IX. CONFIGURATION ARCHITECTURE
Figure 15 describes the configuration architecture for
our asynchronous FPGA “SAFE”. The configuration
chain is designed assuming 1-out-of-2 4-phase protocol
(as described in figure 1(c)). It consists of a series of
Full Buffers terminated by an initialisation circuitry. The
function of the initialisation circuitry is to bring the
whole chain to (‘0’,‘0’) state, and to avoid any invalid
state (‘1’,‘1’) after power up, or to erase a previous
configuration. For initialisation the signal INIT is put to
‘0’, and (config-in-0, config-in-1) are held at
‘0’. The ‘0’s from the configuration input will propagate
throughout the chain making a reset action. For any
invalid state (‘1’,‘1’) after power up, we can see that
the output of the nor gates in the chain will be ‘0’, so
the invalid state will be overwritten by (‘0’,‘0’) from the
11
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Figure 15. The asynchronous configuration chain with reset circuitry.
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Figure 16. If the LUT inputs are not defined, there could be a temporary short-circuit. Due to this bug the LUTs are not usable in the
FPGA, need to be replaced by buffers instead of pass transistors.
input of the chain. Since the signal INIT is held at ’0’
during the initialisation phase, the acknowledge input to
the last stage is ‘0’ for
(config-out-0,config-out-1)
= (0, 0) or (0, 1) or (1, 0) .
It will only accept a (‘0’,‘0’) from the previous stage.
During normal operation, INIT and consequently the
acknowledge input to the last stage is held at ‘1’, hence
the chain will accept any valid state until the chain is
full.
Figure 17(a) shows the mixed-signal simulation results
for an asynchronous configuration chain with five full-
buffer stages and a initialisation cap as explained in
fig. 15. During the initialisation phase, the input to the
configuration chain CONFIG_IN and the INIT signal
is forced to ‘0’. We can see that the (‘0’,‘0’) propagates
along the configuration chain, and the acknowledge
signals are initialised to ‘1’ (READY) state. We can
see that even if the configuration signals are powered
up at an invalid (‘1’,‘1’) state, the reset function of the
initialisation cap brings the chain to a valid precharge
state which is ready to accept a new configuration.
In the configuration phase the INIT signal is kept
at ‘1’, and we can see in fig. 17(a) the configura-
tion bits advancing through the chain. The waveforms
presented are from a mixed-signal simulation, where
the five full-buffers are analog, the initialisation cap
and the testbench controlling CONFIG_IN are digital
circuits. Because of this reason the signals ACK and
ACK_FORM_CAP at two ends of the chain have different
delays.
In Figure. 17(b) we present the simulation results of
the configuration of a single 6-input LUT with parasitic
RC to determine the highest achievable configuration
speed. We used STARRCXT for parasitic extraction and
ADVANCE MS (tool from Mentor Graphics [1]) for
simulation. In the waveforms the input is the digital input
to the configuration chain and the acknowledgement
(ACK) from the chain which is a analog circuit with
parasitic RC. The rise-time (tr), fall-time (tf ) and delay
of the virtual analog to digital converters for simulation
are kept very small (∼ 0.1 ps) so that they do not affect
the simulation results.
From fig. 17(b) we can see that we can configure 64
bits in about ∼ 40 ns. Thus the maximum achievable
configuration speed is around ∼ 1.6 GHz. This high
speed is particular to the asynchronous configuration
12
(a) Single Driver Subset Switch-Box
Legend
Metal 1
Via
Metal 2
Switch
(b) Single Driver Tpair Switch-Box
Figure 14. Porting the solution to single driver architecture.
chain. This is mainly due to the fact that the each
configuration stage output see very small capacitive load,
since it has a fanout of 2: one for the next stage
and one for the switch connected to the output (see
fig. 15). Although this is also true for synchronous
shift register chains, their speed is often limited by the
clock tree skew. The reader might note that there is a
small difference in the acknowledgement (ACK) delay for
CONFIG_DATA_0 and CONFIG_DATA_1. This is due
to the fact that in our FPGA the switches are connected
only to CONFIG_DATA_1, thus it has a bigger delay
than CONFIG_DATA_0. This is also particular to the
asynchronous configuration chain, because in the syn-
chronous case we had to use the worst-case delay to
design the clock tree.
Table III explains the count of configuration bits in
our prototype. Note that the following formulas are illus-
trated in counting the switches of the routing ressources:
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Figure 17. Simulation of the asynchronous configuration chain.
Table III
NO. OF TOTAL CONFIGURATION BITS.
SubModule Qty. Switch
Count
Total
PLB 9 287 2583
PLB Connection Box 9 (12 + 7)× 8 1368
IO Connection Box 12 (3+3)×8×0.5 288
IO Config Bits 12 3× 12 36
Switchbox(Full) 4 6× 8 192
Switchbox(1/2) 8 3× 8 192
Switchbox(1/4) 4 1× 8 32
4691
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(a) Chip Micro-Graph.
Figure 18. Prototype: This chip has been fabricated in CMP run
S65C8 1 in Sept.2008, the date on the photo is a camera malfunction.
• No. of switches in a switchbox with W channels
and N sides =
(
N
W
)×W
• No. of switches in a connection box with NI inputs,
NO outputs and W channels =(NI+NO)×W×Fc.
In our case W = 8, for PLBs NI = 12 and NO = 3
and for IOBs NI = 3 and NO = 3. For PLB connection
boxes, Fc = 1 but for IOB connection boxes Fc = 0.5
X. PROTOTYPE
Figure 18(a) shows the 3× 3 prototype asynchronous
FPGA which has been delivered by the foundry. This
chip has been fabricated using ST Microelectronics 65
nm 7-layer process. The FPGA channel width is 8, and
there are 9 I/Os for each side.
This FPGA has been laid out using a automatic flow
as described in [9]. The balanced place and route has
been obtained through the following steps:
• We first placed the switches, in a symmetric fashion
as outlined in the layout schemes.
• All channel segments are manually routed to
achieve required balance.
• Configuration memory points and signals are
placed/routed automatically, because those re-
sources are not sensitive.
Since size of the FPGA mainly depends on size
of switches and configuration memory points, and not
limited by the routing area. Incorporation of balanced
routing does not result in an overhead in terms of area.
The prototype occupies an area of 1111.6 µm ×
947.6 µm in silicon and contains approximately 200,000
transistors.
Figure 19. The test setup with Altera DE2 board and a small PCB
containing our Prototype.
XI. EXPERIMENTS
We have carried out two experiments. Figure 19 shows
the experimental setup. We used a DE2 board from
Altera to provide the test signals and acquisition of
response from the prototype FPGA. The synchronous-
to-asynchronous converters are implemented in the DE2
board.
A. Experiment 1: Configuration
The sequence for this experiment is the following:
• First the asynchronous configuration chain inside
SAFE is initialised, by putting the INIT input of
SAFE to ‘0’ and then released after some time.
• The bitstream file generated by VPR [6] is loaded
onto the driver board (an Altera DE2) RAM
from a PC. This bitstream is then converted to
asynchronous 1-out-of-2 coding and sent to the
configuration-0 and configuration-1 input signals of
SAFE.
• The DE2 Board monitors the acknowledge output
from SAFE, and puts a new value in the config-
uration chain following 4-phase handshake. It also
counts the number of acknowledges received. For
a successful configuration it should receive exactly
4692 acknowledgments.
We observe that when the bitstream contains only
‘0’s the configuration is successful each time and with
a very high speed. We tested up to 50 MHz, the DE2
board frequency. When the bitstream contains ‘1’s the
configuration only succeeds at a low speed (around
10 kHz).
Despite the fact that due to asynchronous coding ‘0’s
and ‘1’s are equivalent in terms of transitions, we think
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Figure 20. Measured trace of configuration signals.
that this behaviour might be due to a bug which we will
be trying to explain with simulations in appendix A at
page 18. However, it does not hinder the test in real
silicon of the routing strategy presented in Sec. VII.
B. Experiment 2: Measuring Hop Mismatch
The goal of this experiment is to find out, the bal-
ancedness between the two rails constituting the dual-
rail of asynchronous logic. This is very important in
terms of robustness against side-channel attack since any
difference between these two rails will give out the data
values to the attacker. The power-constant methodology
entirely depends on this balancedness. Indeed, other
biases, like the “early propagation effect” [45], do not
exist in a “routing-only” netlist.
Figures 21(a) and 21(b) describe the experimental
setup. We route a dual-rail netlist in the FPGA. The
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Window Rail-0 Window Rail-1
(a) Measuring the difference between rail-0 and rail-1 for different
lengths of rail-0.
Placement from file hop_mismatch0.place.  bb_cost 0.18.
I_OB0_JP2_68
I_OB1_JP2_71
I_OB2_JP2_60
I_OR6_JP2_80
I_OR7_JP1_35
I_OR8_JP1_36
LEGEND
Rail-1
Rail-0 hop mismatch = 0
Rail-0 hop mismatch = 1
Rail-0 hop mismatch = 3
Rail-0 hop mismatch = 5
Rail-0 hop mismatch = 7
(b) Different pairs of dualrails to evaluate effect of hop-mismatch.
Figure 21. Description of the experiment 2 “Hop Mismatch”.
route for RAIL-1 of this dual-rail stays constant over the
experiment. The route for RAIL-0 is varied incorporating
(0,1,3,5,7) differences in hops w.r.t. RAIL-1, as shown
in figure 21(b). We send 4 pulses each for RAIL-1
and RAIL-0, and we measure the power consumption.
This measurement is done with a separate trigger signal
encompassing 4 + 4 pulses. Among the 4 pulses we
choose a window for the comparison. Let’s say W1(t) is
the trace for RAIL-1 and W0(t) is the trace for RAIL-0
within this window.
The balancedness between these two traces is then
calculated as:
Balance =
RMS(W0(t))
RMS(W1(t))
,
where RMS is the root mean square. This ratio captures
the difference of energy contained in each side-channel
curve.
The corresponding traces are shown in Fig. 19. We
can see the triggering instants of the measurement. The
traces for various hop mismatch and the balancedness
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Figure 22. The results for different values of Hop Mismatch
(superimposed and staggered).
values are indicated in 22. Figure 19 shows the traces for
different hop mismatch values superposed in a staggered
fashion for comparison purpose. They use the same color
code as in fig. 21(b).
Hop Mismatch Balance
0 1.106
1 1.120
3 1.158
5 1.119
7 1.173
The results show that the hop mismatch definitely has
an influence on the observed balancedness. This devia-
tion of the balancedness from one indicates that a bias
exists; such a bias is typically exploited by side-channel
analyses, and therefore quantifies the implementation
vulnerability. One also notes that the unbalance is not
strictly speaking linear with the hop mismatch.
C. A note on Variability
The results regarding ”hop-mismatch” and ”Balance
of Power consumption” in subsection XI-B can be in-
terpreted as the superposition of a linear component and
random components. We can see that power consumption
of a dual rail is largely proportional to the hop mis-
match, so there is a strong linear component of power
consumption of dual-rails. However there is also a non-
linear component as we can see from the result for ”hop
mismatch =5”. The authors suspect that this non-linear
component is mainly due to variation. Notable causes of
variation in deep-submicron CMOS are [46]
• Systematic Process Variation
• Layout Dependent Variation
• Random Variation (Transistor Mismatch) [35]
Block 424 (inreg_reg_11_SDDL1) at (12, 17) selected.
Figure 23. Dual Rail routing Example
In this article we tried mainly to minimize the Layout
dependent variation, and systematic process variation can
be reduced by using matched transistor pairs. However
the ever increasing random component of variation (with
technology scaling) could still be exploited by the at-
tacker, and probably constitutes a fundamental limit to
the anonymity from side-channel attackers.
D. Secure Dual Rail Routing
As we have seen the previous chapter, that there is a
strong linear component in the effect of hop-mismatch,
and power consumption balance between dual-rails, we
should guarantee balanced dual rail routing in CAD
tools. We devised a simple dual rail routing algorithm
where the routing tracks in FPGAs are divided into
two domains, and each rail is then routed in separate
domains. Because of the symmetrical domains, the routes
for both rails are the same. However this will work
only for homogeneous architectures, such as tracks with
unit lengths, and subset switchbox. In table IV we show
the results of dual rail routings for some netlists in the
QUIP [4]Benchmarks suite in a simple uniform architec-
ture. The benchmarks are WDDL implementation of the
netlists. As shown in table IV we can guarantee a zero
hop-mismatch routing with this technique. However this
is only valid for simple homogeneous architectures, and
needs considerable modification to be used in commer-
cial architectures.
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Table IV
CHANNEL WIDTH AND HOP-MISMATCH FOR DUAL RAIL ROUTING
Netlist No. Nets Breadth First Dual Breadth First
Channel
Width
Hop Mismatch
/Dual-rail
Channel
Width
Hop Mismatch
/Dual-rail
barrel16 wddl 626 15 2.89 16 0
barrel32 wddl 1482 20 2.78 20 0
barrel64 wddl 3254 23 4.41 22 0
mux32 16bit wddl 2964 12 0.83 12 0
mux64 16bit wddl 5854 14 0.51 14 0
mux8 128bit wddl 5932 11 2.66 12 0
mux8 64bit wddl 2988 10 2.25 10 0
xbar 16x16 wddl 706 14 1.59 14 0
XII. CONCLUSION
In this article we discussed the suitability of an
asynchronous FPGA as a countermeasure to the physical
cryptanalyses, and as a prototyping device for such
countermeasures. Intrinsic resistance of asynchronous
circuits to faults injection, and power constant signalling
makes them good candidates for such countermeasures.
Moreover because of their reconfigurable nature, it is
possible to incorporate dynamic countermeasures along
with static countermeasures. We believe a practical so-
lution must use both of them to achieve highest level
of security. We presented approximate models of power
consumption and delay on which our countermeasures
are based, and defined our objectives for static counter-
measures.
Keeping the prototyping role in mind, we presented a
multi-style asynchronous PLB, and proposed a fine grain
routing architecture, so that any m-out-of-n coding and
various asynchronous protocols can be mapped onto this
architecture. As shown in various experiments through-
out the article the power constant logical level protocols
can not succeed without balanced interconnects. Layout
statistics, and experiments on the extracted netlist from
a prototype FPGA, presents the kind of balancedness
in dynamic power consumption that can be achieved
with the subset switchbox and the associated binary
tree connection box. We also present a new physical
implementation of the FPGA switch box called Tpair
switchbox, which provides indiscernability in EM emis-
sion for the dual-rails routed through it.
Although the solutions proposed in actual layout as-
sume bidirectional FPGA interconnect, we show how
these solutions can be ported to other flavours of in-
terconnect such as single-driver, both at the switchbox
and connection box levels. Finally we provide with some
experimental results on 3×3 prototype, although largely
hindered by a bug in the circuit. However these test
results will be of use to future designs. We carry out
a profiling of power consumption for different values of
hop mismatch and we see a clear dependence. The ex-
periment on extracted netlist shows the very high speed
of the asynchronous configuration chain ∼1.6 GHz, and
we also verified the functionality of this in silicon at
a lower speed, again because of the bug which will be
corrected in the future designs.
In this paper we mainly concentrated on layout depen-
dent (geometric) variations in dual-rails, which is only
one component of the variations in power consumption
between two rails. However from experimental results
we discover significant other components in power con-
sumption balance. Hence as future research directions,
we would like to propose nullifying the effect of CMOS
variation (by taking alternate routes in a random fashion)
and from other sources of variation from rail to rail.
We would also like to stress the importance of CAD
algorithms in physically securing the application, such
as, automatically routing dual-rails through the FPGA
in a balanced way. These important issues are the main
future research challenges.
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APPENDIX
Due to the problems encountered during the configu-
ration as explained in subsection XI-A, we investigated
into the cause of this anomaly. We did the simulation
of a single 6-input LUT inside the PLB. The imple-
mentation of this LUT is explained in subsection VI-4.
In figure 16 we provide a more detailed view of the
LUT configuration chain and switches. In actual silicon
the memory points are connected to the LUT output
through Transmission Gates (denoted as pass transistors
in fig. 16). The LUT inputs are decoded in a such a way
that only one among these parallely connected Trans-
mission Gates is “ON”, depending on the input value,
and the corresponding memory point should appear at
the output.
However when the inputs go through a transition, there
is a temporary short-circuit between the two concerned
Transmission Gates (TGs). Because of the bidirectional
nature of TGs, this disturbs the configuration chain itself.
One LUT memory point is written into another one.
We did the same simulation with tri-state buffers
instead of Transmission Gates, in this case the output
changes according to the inputs and memory points.
We think that this could be a possible cause of the
anomaly during the configuration of the FPGA “SAFE”.
In actual silicon, during the configuration, the LUT
inputs are not forced to ’0’ or ’1’. If the inputs go
through parasitic transitions during configuration, this
will introduce invalid state (′1′,′ 1′) in the configuration
chain leading to random behaviour.
Further investigations, and testing is going on at
TIMA, Grenoble, so that the FPGA can be used for
basic testing, and this simulation results will be taken
into account during the next tape out.
